Atheist Ethics (Part 7)
By Julian Baggini
Consequences
It is an obvious fact about actions that they have consequences. What is more, these consequences can be good or bad: they can make things better or worse. Arguably, the mere fact that we recognize this to be true is enough to get some form of morality going.
To give a simple example, if I kick someone for no reason then that causes them pain. That pain is a bad thing which cannot in any way be outweighed by any better, good thing, because there is no reason for the kicking. Recognizing that the causing of this pain is a bad thing thus gives me a reason not to kick them. It should be obvious that if we start thinking in this way we have the basis for a kind of morality, one that is usually termed consequentialist. We have reasons for not doing things that have bad consequences and we have reasons to do things that have good consequences, just because we recognize that it is better that good things happen than bad ones.
As soon as we try and build on this banal-sounding truism to construct a complete moral theory we head into difficulties. But it does not seem to me that these subsequent difficulties in any way cast doubt upon the simple observations that set us off in this direction. For instance, consider one difficulty, which concerns the status of these reasons for action. If we start to think about why a thing having bad consequences is a reason for not doing it we can soon see a puzzle. What kinds of reasons are they? Are they reasons that express simple facts? Is 'pain is bad thing' a kind of factual truth on a par with lead is heavier than water'? Many philosophers have thought not. 'Lead is heavier than water' is a simple, incontrovertible truth which is demonstrated by the physical sciences. In saying that it is true we are doing no more than describing the world. But when we say 'pain is a bad thing' it seems we are not just describing the world, we are evaluating it. If we were simply describing the world we could say things like 'pain is found to be unpleasant' or 'pain is something living creatures seek to avoid', but the moment we say it is bad we move beyond the facts to making value judgements.
If this line of reasoning is correct, then any moral argument that is based on a claim that 'pain is a bad thing' is not just expressing truths about the world but is making a judgement about it. And that means that moral claims are not true or false in the same way as factual claims are. Because moral claims are judgements, it is always possible for someone to disagree with them without saving something that is factually false. So if I say pain is not bad, you may disagree with me but you cannot say I have made a factual error. There are various philosophical reasons why this question is important. But in practice I am not sure it matters one bit. All we need to get going on a broadly consequentialist way of thinking about ethics is to accept that pain is a bad thing. Now it is an interesting question whether or not 'pain is a bad thing' is a fact or a judgement, but as long as we agree that pain is a bad thing, for practical purposes the question does not require an answer. But what about the person who does not accept that pain is a bad thing? Let us assume this disagreement is not on technical grounds (in other words that they refuse to assert that it is a bad thing because they believe to do so entails some philosophical commitment they do not want to sign up to). In such a circumstance I don't think we need to be concerned by the fact that our moral view does not command 100% agreement. As I have already argued, morality in the end requires a personal commitment and the acceptance of responsibility. In some unusual circumstances we may be confronted with a situation where rational argument can take us no further and we are confronted with a stark disagreement: I think (unnecessary) pain is bad, you do not. In such a situation we can only stand up for our values. And since our most basic values are shared with the vast majority of other human beings, such resolution in the face of dissent is hardly fascistic.
I would not want to suggest that there aren't real problems with consequentialist thinking. Indeed, I think there are a great many and that a purely consequentialist moral system is deeply flawed. However, that does not diminish the fact that in simply accepting that bad consequences provide reasons not to do certain actions and good consequences provide reasons to do others we have one pillar upon which to build a godless morality.
[I think that most people are to a large extent consequentialists. We do things because we think that the consequences will be good or do not do things because we think that the consequences will be bad. Of course, as Baggini points out, there are many problems with this idea as the only guide to morality – but as a single strand along with others it does offer a useful (if far from perfect) guide to the idea of what is right and what is wrong without the need for God.]
11 comments:
An interesting discussion.
I agree that a consequentialist approach seems rational and a good philosophical starting point.
Each clarification seems to push the question further back: if right and wrong are not intrinsic qualities, we ground them in "good" and "bad." But even then we find ourselves being unable to tether these terms absolutely.
I've always felt that the so-called "Golden Rule" comes closest to giving us a durable pro-social stance (and indeed it's the bedrock sensibility which we utilize moment-to-moment), and it's essentially utilitarian, consequentialist.
Baggini's discussion raises the possibility that we're really dealing with majority numbers. MOST people find pain unpleasant and something to avoid, so pain becomes bad.
What makes me uneasy is the idea that all these terms and concepts can be co-opted by a large enough majority of religious folks. Right and wrong and good and bad in this scenario are just what most people claim them to be. But if we can't agree (though most of us would) that pain is bad, that's where we are.
(An aside, Hitchens' Mother Theresa book talks about her systematic denial of painkillers to her critically ill patients, based on her idea that suffering was "purifying" and, presumably, "good." Food for thought.)
wunelle said: I agree that a consequentialist approach seems rational and a good philosophical starting point.
It's certainly not a bad place to start.
wunelle said: But even then we find ourselves being unable to tether these terms absolutely.
Which might actually be a good thing. If the terms we use are not *absolute* it gives us the opportunity to examine what each individual means by things like justice, courage & honour (and much else besides). After all we each have to decide how we want to live our lives and thinking about what we actually mean by what we say and what we think when we use these words helps us to do just that.
wunelle said: I've always felt that the so-called "Golden Rule" comes closest to giving us a durable pro-social stance.
It's definitely a useful tool in thinking about morality and acting in a moral fashion.
wunelle said: Right and wrong and good and bad in this scenario are just what most people claim them to be. But if we can't agree (though most of us would) that pain is bad, that's where we are.
I don't think that a persons morality depends that much on numbers. Sure, if the majority think a certain way it's likely that their morality will be that cultures morality - but there are always minority opinions on these things giving alternative views of right and wrong. I doubt very much if you could get everyone to agree on everything or even most things.
Then I think that morality depends a great deal on the personal. We're not automatons after all. We can think about ethical issues and come to our own opinion on them. No doubt my moral beliefs are, by and large, my cultures beliefs but I definitely have my own individual ideas on the subject too - even before I began studying it.
I think it's important to discuss moral issues because it allows us to see that not everything thinks the same about them - normally for very good reasons. I think it's a very healthy activity.
"I don't think that a persons morality depends that much on numbers..."
What interests me in this context is this idea, which we meet again and again, that people can find a moral imperative to do things which are at other times morally anathema.
Take the case in my comment above, about the Israeli women trying to stone a Palestinian girl (I use this as an example: I'm sure there are plenty of instances of Palestinians trying to stone Jews). Surely no one thinks that stoning a child is moral, and yet how many Israelis in this case are willing to condemn these women? Is the justification that retribution is warranted to correct a previous wrong?
And while stoning a child may be wrong generically, I suspect the Israeli women felt themselves morally in the right in this case; and one doesn't have to wander very far into history to find these weaknesses in religious morality.
Julian Baggini said – “However, that does not diminish the fact that in simply accepting that bad consequences provide reasons not to do certain actions and good consequences provide reasons to do others we have one pillar upon which to build a godless morality.”
CK said – “… but as a single strand along with others it does offer a useful (if far from perfect) guide to the idea of what is right and what is wrong without the need for God.”
Ahem… It’s called a conscience.
Why does anyone need to specifically reason ways to have morals without God? As Julian says in his essay, you must reasonably see that any judgment on the world can be confronted with disagreement. This is the nature of our minds, they are not alike.
So, what does this prove, I wonder? Am I, the Christian, to be blown away by the meaning of the statement “We can be moral without God!”?
Well, I’d certainly hope you have the ability to correctly recognize incorrect and correct behavior. That is one of the philosophical truths of being a member in ‘society’. In fact I’d hope a lot of people on both sides, (those claiming God and those not) would use a much more ‘reasonable’ moral code and not fail it.
I’d argue that a great many intelligent individuals could reasonably convene, under certain circumstances, and produce a set of unanimously decided ‘laws’ that would foster in the “Golden Age” of this planet. I think a few religious folks could attend, but I’d expect a few atheists would be equally able to deliver moral argument and supposition. All that would be required is that they be ‘good’ people.
It is not all that complicated really. Most children can, when presented with a story, decide what the most ‘correct’ thing to do would be. Returning the money someone lost, giving someone a friendly word when they’re sad, and so on.
CK… I’d argue the reasons we are NOT moral are much more significant of a topic that the reasons that we are. How do people become trapped in immoral behavior that allows them to eventually ‘fuzz’ what’s right and wrong to make things ‘justified’?
Why do you need any ‘pillars’ to build your morality on? You always know what’s right or wrong because you simply do. You know what I’m talking about, we all do.
You see CK it allows you to be responsible for your actions even if you don’t believe in Him. The reason that’s important will be apparent later.
On that note… I’ll say “Hello Again!” =) and see what you’ve got for a response.
Hello sirkolgate & welcome back. Been anywhere nice?
sirkolgate asked: Why does anyone need to specifically reason ways to have morals without God?
Because there are those who wrongly believe that there can be no morality without God. By extension this implies that those who do not believe in God cannot be moral. Therefore I have been posting a series of articles putting forward one view of Godless morality to show that the 'argument' that atheists are inherently immoral is false.
sirkolgate asked: Am I, the Christian, to be blown away by the meaning of the statement “We can be moral without God!”?
That's entirely up to you - though I doubt that such a simple statement will "blow you away" though it does apparently come as a surprise to some theists.
sirkolgate said: I’d argue that a great many intelligent individuals could reasonably convene, under certain circumstances, and produce a set of unanimously decided ‘laws’ that would foster in the “Golden Age” of this planet.
Oh, I doubt that *very* much! Trying to get people to agree on anything is tough enough. Trying to get *everyone* to agree on morality is probably impossible.
sirkolgate said: It is not all that complicated really. Most children can, when presented with a story, decide what the most ‘correct’ thing to do would be.
If morality is *so* simple that even little children know the difference between right & wrong then why do we spend so much of our time *teaching* children the difference. If we already *know* what constitutes moral behaviour why do we need moral rules & prescriptions from various organisations and belief systems. Surely if we already *knew* how to be perfectly moral creatures such teachings & rules would be unessesary....
sirkolgate said: I’d argue the reasons we are NOT moral are much more significant of a topic that the reasons that we are. How do people become trapped in immoral behavior that allows them to eventually ‘fuzz’ what’s right and wrong to make things ‘justified’?
The problem with that idea is (of course) that if people cannot agree on any kind of objective morality then what is immoral to one group is not immoral to another. Therefore you cannot say with any confidence that a particular act is moral or not - and cannot judge that a person or a group has "become trapped in immoral behavior".
sirkolgate said: Why do you need any ‘pillars’ to build your morality on? You always know what’s right or wrong because you simply do. You know what I’m talking about, we all do.
If that is the case how do you explain the fact that opinion on morality differs between cultures, groups and individuals? How is it that Catholic morality & Protestant morality differs at all, or Jewish, Christian & Muslim? How is it that morality differs over time even in the same culture? If we all *know* the difference between right & wrong how is debate on this issue even possible? If morality is 'simple' then why do people disagree so much about it?
Morality is anything but simple - which is exactly why we need pillars to build it on.
CK,
Religious people and Atheists can agree on what is Moral in relation to ‘most’ things.
The problem that arises out of that is the nature of things which a religious person may see as ‘immoral’ based on the Bible that an Atheist would ignore.
Thing like consensual group sex (where all parties are of a certain age), the definition of holidays, certain movements in science, and the like are all things that are hard to find ‘moral’ values for. This is because their content is complex and most often it is some religious document that conflicts with it. As an Atheist, with no religious document to hold you back, you can look at things from only a purely ‘science/reason’ perspective.
*shrug* So… that would make it seem as though Atheists are actually slightly MORE moralistic than religious folk simply based on their ability to ignore, what to them is, worthless literature.
Here’s the thing. Most things in life ARE fairly black and white. The gray is a small percentage. I’d if you’d list out all the ‘decisions’ people make that have ‘moral’ factors you’d find 1-5% fall in the category that gets the most ‘press’.
My main argument against this article is the supposition that moral behavior requires something to do with God. The fact that God is brought into the argument is silly to me, why not post the hypothesis and leave God out of it?
I remain on a reduced blogging schedule but Sirkolgate brings an interesting perspective that has rekindled my interest in this train-wreck of an argument.
I have not been following this interminable topic of late, and the last thing I remember Baggini was assuming he'd scored one for his case by invoking Euthyphro's Dilemma (which would come as quite a surprise to Plato), but my comment has nothing to do with Baggini's convoluted assertions. For the umpteenth time, I want to object to the oft-repeated claim that the moral argument, by extension ... implies that those who do not believe in God cannot be moral.
The logic of the moral argument rests squarely on the ontology of morality itself; what a person believes has no bearing on the matter whatsoever. You may feel like the moral argument implies atheists can't be moral, but the fact is the moral argument itself makes no such implications.
Therefore I have been posting a series of articles putting forward one view of Godless morality to show that the 'argument' that atheists are inherently immoral is false.
Eight (now 9) posts trying to prove something nobody disputes?
sirkolgate said: Religious people and Atheists can agree on what is Moral in relation to ‘most’ things.
Probably. But their areas of disagreement would be pretty deep I'm guessing.
sirkolgate said: The problem that arises out of that is the nature of things which a religious person may see as ‘immoral’ based on the Bible that an Atheist would ignore.
Indeed. As Atheists do not believe that morality comes from a non-existent God.
sirkolgate said: So… that would make it seem as though Atheists are actually slightly MORE moralistic than religious folk simply based on their ability to ignore, what to them is, worthless literature.
It *can* be argued that non-theistic morality is indeed *more* moral because it is not a Command Morality backed up with supernatural carrots and sticks. I wouldn't say that the Bible was 'worthless' literature though....
sirkolgate said: Here’s the thing. Most things in life ARE fairly black and white. The gray is a small percentage.
I'm sure that would depend who you talked to. I think that there would also be quite significant differences between what some regarded as 'white' & others as 'black'.
sirkolgate said: My main argument against this article is the supposition that moral behavior requires something to do with God. The fact that God is brought into the argument is silly to me, why not post the hypothesis and leave God out of it?
Because I have seen arguments put forward that *all* morality comes from God and that if you don't base your morality on His rules then you are immoral by definition. This is absolute nonsense. It is more than possible to be a moral creature without the existence of God being a necessary pre-condition. It is not a case of still being moral despite a (supposed) 'rejection' of God but the fact that morality is *totally* independent of any human ideas regarding a mythical deity.
laughing boy said: Eight (now 9) posts trying to prove something nobody disputes?
That's rather strange. I'm sure that I remember you saying that morality without God was impossible.... Maybe it was another theist.....
Yeah... we're all in agreement (on God being outside of Morality) so let's move on to the 'newer' post =)
sirkolgate said: we're all in agreement (on God being outside of Morality)
I wouldn't use the word 'outside' myself. Unnecessary, irrelevant, superfluous, redundant.... are some of the words I would use....
As to a 'newer' post... You would've noticed that I post something here most days....... but I actually have an interest in ethics and moral philosophy which are subjects I shall be posting on (from time to time) for some time to come.
That's rather strange. I'm sure that I remember you saying that morality without God was impossible.... Maybe it was another theist.....
Explaining why that does not imply that atheists can't be moral would mean repeating what I just said, and there's no need since you can just go back and read it.
Before I move on to Part 9 I need to ask if I've missed something foundational to what was presented in Part 8. The basic idea here seems to be that we can determine what's right from what's wrong by considering if the consequences of the act are good or bad. But doesn't right = good and wrong = bad? If so, it seems to me the argument of Part 8 can be validly restated as "If an act returns good results it's good and if it returns bad results it's bad."
I don't see how this helps since good and bad are the terms we're trying to define.
Also I would argue that pain is not bad anymore than a fire alarm is bad. Pain, generally, is an indicator that something is wrong. I think such indicators are good.
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