Just Finished Reading: Bomber Boys – Fighting Back 1940-1945 by Patrick Bishop (FP: 2007)

It was much more than a simple belief, it was an article of faith. With little evidence to support the idea it was assumed, all through the Interwar years, that the bomber would always get through to its target and, once there, would cause great devastation, loss of life and general panic. Those who planned for such things knew of only one effective defence – the fear of retaliation – and so RAF Bomber Command was tasked to destroy the enemy if anyone had the temerity to attack the British homeland. When war was declared in September 1939 this is exactly what they did and, for the first time, faced the stark reality. Bombers did not always get through – nowhere near in fact.

It was a rude awakening. Throughout the 1930’s the RAF had taken delivery of some of the most advanced as well as the fastest bombers in the world. With great confidence they attacked their targets in France and suffered greatly for it losing 20, 30, and 50% of their aircraft in a single operation. They were truly unsustainably casualties. Very quickly operations were changed to the hours of darkness. Immediately the casualty rates dropped but so did the accuracy of any bombing with ordnance landing sometimes miles from its intended target. The RAF was simply not ready for precision night time raids. Coupled with this the overall bombloads carried by each plane was pitiful. Even when the aircraft arrived on target the damage caused was negligible. The British were hitting back but the enemy hardly noticed and, for the steady low level losses, the results were much less than hoped for, anticipated or promised. Something had to be done.

In the years that followed the older, smaller and slower bombers were phased out or given other duties. The technology of navigation and accurate targeting improved by leaps and bounds and aircraft grew larger, more powerful and with much increased bombloads. More importantly the sheer number of bombers increased year on year. Where initially 20, 30 or 40 bombers flew out on any particular mission now 100 or more where assigned to each target. Increasingly targets were hit repeatedly giving them little chance to recover and the number of 1,000 bomber raids taking place became increasingly commonplace. But the enemy had been far from idle. The Germans developed an effective radar system slaved to deadly anti-aircraft guns like the much feared Flack-88. Radar was also fitted to a new breed of night fighter. Techniques to mislead bomber streams and the logistics to hit them throughout their long flights both to the target and back again were honed to perfection until few missions returned to base without significant losses. It was a rare crew indeed that completed its 30 mission limit before moving to safer duties.

But eventually the RAF bomber war provided results. With the RAF bombing primarily at night and the USAAF doing the same primarily in daylight the Axis powers in Europe were being ground into dust. Eventually after many loses and many setbacks Strategic Bombing finally lived up to its promise and assisted in the victory in Europe – or at least its defenders have maintained since 1945. Its many detractors have argued otherwise showing that, right up to the end the productive power of Axis industry hardly faltered under Allied bombing despite the appalling loss of life on the ground.

I am familiar with most of the history of RAF bomber command during World War 2. Still this well written and insightful volume kept me more than interested throughout its almost 400 pages. Although ‘Ops’ remained front and centre in the narrative the author spent a great deal of time looking at the lived experiences of the crews themselves, looking at their training, how crews were selected, the stresses of combat, life on base and so on. Likewise the author didn’t shy away from the lived experience of German citizens in the towns and cities that were the RAFs target for tonight. Those sections were particularly disturbing and gave me much pause for thought throughout my time reading this book. The author most definitely did not shy away from the argument, still ongoing today, about the morality of bombing whole cities rather than at least attempting (as did the USAAF) targeting clearly military targets. It’s not a question that can easily be answered although the author gives it a good go.

I think this is my first book by this author and I shall enjoy reading more of his work. Certainly knowledgeable he comes at the subject from many angles and does not shy away from difficult questions or counter arguments. Whilst not afraid to offer his own opinion he gives the reader enough information and argument to make up their own considered viewpoint. Recommended for anyone interested in the campaign or the controversy.