Just Finished Reading: Battle of Britain by Patrick Bishop (FP: 2009) [332pp] 

It is virtually without argument that the Battle of Britain, fought mostly in the skies over southern England between 10 July and 31 October 1940, was the most significant conflict in the country's modern era. If the battle had been lost and the Luftwaffe had gained even temporary air-superiority over the coast there was a real danger that an invasion could have been attempted (it would have failed IMO). Fortunately for Britain and, again arguably, the world the battle was won and Operation Sealion – the ‘planned’ invasion of Great Britain – was postponed indefinitely. 

Organised in 5 sections covering (very roughly) 2-6 weeks depending on the level of activity, this well written and often fascinating study lays out the battle as it ramped up. Initially German High Command (or at least AH himself) fully expected Britain to seek terms following the retreat from Dunkirk. Of course, Churchill had no intention of surrendering and it was always going to be ‘fight on’. Although essentially on our own – not strictly true in the grand scope of things – the UK had a lot going for it. The English Channel was only 26 miles at its most narrow point but was often both a treacherous and unpredictable stretch of water. However much the Germans thought of it as a particularly wide river it was nothing of the sort. Despite the loss of a great deal of equipment in France the British army was far from defeated and would, it was expected, give a good account of itself if any planned invasion did occur. What is more, the Royal Navy was still the largest in the world and would be expected the throw everything it had at any invasion fleet. It would be far from plain sailing even across a theoretically calm English Channel. But it was the RAF that was Britain’s first line of defence. If it could hold back the might of the Luftwaffe all bets would be off – but could it do so? 

On the face of things, it was going to be a very hard fight indeed for the RAF. Not only were they greatly outnumbered in both fighters and bombers, but the German pilots had gained a great deal of valuable experience on their European battlefields. However, that wasn’t a completely good thing. OK, they had gained experience – but at the cost of overconfidence. Most of their enemies across Europe had been using out of date aircraft and had quickly succumbed to highly effective tactics and had been largely destroyed on the ground. Such conditions would not prevail over England. Likewise, the Luftwaffe was mainly designed to excel at one task – supporting the army in its Blitzkrieg tactics – and this it did very well indeed (at least early on). But over England these tactics would not be required and a whole other skill set would be needed. The German bomber force, likewise, was a tactical rather than a strategic one. In 1940 the Germans did not possess a single 4 engine bomber, so their range and bomb load were limited. 

Facing them were two fighters – the Hurricane and Spitfire – that were at least the equal of anything the Germans had to oppose them. On top of this the British boasted probably the most sophisticated and technically advanced air-defence system in the world – something the Luftwaffe had never faced before. Although outnumbered, the RAF fighters always seemed to be in the right place and the right time. It was very rare indeed for any number of German aircraft not to be intercepted either on their way to a target, on their way back or even both. Although initial losses for Germany were light, they were constant. What made things worse of course, was that a German pilot bailing out over England was captured whereas a RAF pilot doing likewise could be back in a fighter the very next day. What was even more telling was the disparity in aircraft production. During the battle the RAF were hardly ever short of fighters – indeed production of new planes and recovery of damaged ones increased during the fight. The shortage – sometimes desperate – was pilots, especially experienced ones. There are so many stories of fresh, incredibly young, pilots who went straight from minimal training into combat within hours of arriving at their new squadrons only never to come back. 

Without trying to precis the whole book, the Battle of Britain amounted to a massive miscalculation on the part of the Luftwaffe and most especially of Herman Goering who promised AH that he could defeat England in a matter of weeks. German ‘intelligence’ was quite pitiful consistently underestimating the strength of the RAF until it became obvious that they could not be defeated in the given timeframe with the planned invasion of the Soviet Union pressing. But failing to knock Britain out of the war allowed for the dreaded ‘war on two fronts’ that the German High Commanded worried about so much – rightly. Ultimately, of course, it allowed Britain to be a jumping off point for European liberation and as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for bombing raids deep into the Reich itself. 

Even if you have a good grasp of the Battle of Britain this is definitely worth a read. Although I regard myself as reasonably knowledgeable, I still picked up on a few things – even such basics as why the RAF fighters flew in ‘Vic threes’ whilst the Luftwaffe flew in ‘Finger fours’ - which always pleases me. I think this is my second book by this author and it won’t be my last. Recommended.