Just Finished Reading: Red Devils – The Trailblazers of the Paras in World War Two – An Authorised History of the Parachute Regiment by Mark Urban (FP: 2022) [280pp] 

You couldn’t help but be impressed by the German’s use of glider and parachute forces as the Blitzkrieg rolled across western Europe. With bridges secured and supposedly impregnable fortresses taken it would be hard not to be. The second inevitable thought was: why haven’t we got anything like that? So was born the idea and the seed of Britain’s elite Parachute Regiment. 

Prime Minister Winston Churchill was, of course, notoriously fond of special elite units like the Royal Marine Commandoes and the Special Air (and Boat) Service. So, he was delighted with the idea of dropping in troops from the skies to take and hold positions – and much else besides – where required. But the question was – where can they be used, and would they be of any use? Their first test came with a smash & grab operation in France early in 1942. The mission, Operation Biting, was a simple one – to grab German radar equipment that was giving the RAF a hard time so that countermeasures could be developed (more to come on this). It was both a successful mission and an ideal opportunity to learn valuable lessons before moving on to anything bigger. Naturally one of the consequences of ‘going large’ was that a purely volunteer force was no longer an option, so entire Infantry units were transferred over, and parachute (or glider) training was undertaken.  

The next opportunity/learning experience was in North Africa where more limitations were exposed for all to see – specially the lack of heavy anti-tank equipment – which cost the Regiment dearly. But it was also the place where they got the famous ‘nickname’ of the Red Devils, given to them by the opposing German forces before of their fighting prowess. Not surprisingly, the name was adopted with pride. Moving on to Sicily more painful lessons along with more encounters with their opposite numbers, the German parachutists, helped harden the Regiment for its toughest and most important mission yet – the invasion of Continental Europe: D Day. The deployments of paratroopers and glider forces (including the famous taking of Pegasus Bridge) before and around D-Day was a huge success and paved the way for the successful landings that day and in the following ones. Losses were high but still significantly less than expected or feared. The new doctrine had more than lived up to expectations. 

Not surprisingly, after such a success the temptation was to go even larger. Hubris, it must be said, played a significant role in the idea and planning of Operation Market Garden which hoped to shorten the war by leapfrogging through the Low Countries and end with pointing a dagger at the heart of the Rhineland. It was, as we now know with hindsight ‘a bridge too far’ as the attempted capture of the crossing at Arnhem failed spectacularly. From the authors notes it does seem that the idea was both rushed in the planning stage and in its application. Cooler heads should have seen that the operation was simply too risky and relied with everything going exactly right. Having many year's experience at this point the planners should have been well aware that NO plan survives contact with the enemy. So, when the troops at Arnhem met a Panzer division at rest it was effectively game over – despite a truly heroic defence of their perimeter (more later!) which has since passed into legend.  

Although a little too exhaustive in places, this was often a fascinating look at – from the British standpoint at least – a new way of warfare. When used properly (certainly not always the case) it was devastatingly effective. When used improperly (when strengths and weaknesses were not understood by Infantry commanders) casualty lists ballooned. Even so, the Parachute Regiment always fought above its weight as befits an elite unit and has more than earned its place in history. An interesting read and, therefore, recommended.