ID cards will provoke a national identity crisis

Andrew Phillips Sunday February 12, 2006 for The Observer

Tomorrow, the House of Lords' eight votes against the Identity Cards Bill come before the Commons. It is still unclear how many the government will concede. Labour argues that most people already carry several identification cards, so why not a single, ultra-safe one? However, industry experts warn that that could create a fraudsters' honeypot. And compulsory ID cards will entitle state authorities to a tranche of biometric and other data, some highly sensitive. The bill devotes 135 lines just to defining that dragnet, with penalties of up to £2,500 for failure to comply. Another comfy notion is that we're only following Europe. In fact, three countries don't have ID cards, 10 do but on a voluntary basis (as the Lords propose), with only 10 having compulsory cards. But none stores nearly as much data as we propose. Our scheme would be a free-world 'first', to add to omnipresent CCTV cameras, phone traffic data, vehicle tracking and so on. Labour trumpets public support. But polling has not been deliberative, the results have varied greatly and, if and when the public understands the ramifications, including cost, opposition could harden, as happened in Australia.

We're endlessly told that 'if you've nothing to hide, you've nothing to fear'. In today's technological and managerial culture, this is difficult to rebut. One must start from every citizen's right to privacy. The Germans understand. Since the Bush wiretapping scandal, Americans are beginning to. But we in Britain are in danger of sleepwalking into authoritarianism, as the information commissioner warned, where the state stockpiles personal data in case it may 'come in useful'. Perhaps the Rubicon was crossed after the discovery in 2000 of 50,000 DNA samples wrongly retained. Instead of tightening the regime, the illegality was legitimised and the law changed to allow retention without charge or caution. That experience feeds expectations of creeping extensions of the ID card database, not forgetting that in 1995 Tony Blair was dead against compulsory ID cards. Scepticism is further stoked by government claims that it has a mandate for compulsory cards. Its manifesto, in fact, talked only of 'rolling out [the scheme] initially on a voluntary basis'. Under close parliamentary scrutiny, some innovations gather credibility, while some wilt, which is why the government lost a series of critical votes. The first attacked its refusal to give an estimate of the all-in costs of the scheme with the excuse that that would compromise commercial sensitivity. That has not stopped the government trying to rubbish the in-depth viability study by 16 LSE professors and teams who have estimated the 10-year cost at £19-24bn.

The government justifies this massive adventure primarily on the basis that compulsory cards will significantly reduce terrorism, crime, social security fraud and illegal immigration. But its rationale has imploded. On terrorism, Stella Rimington and Lord Carlile have torpedoed government claims. As for crime, particularly identity theft, senior police officers disagree with the government, while industry experts reckon that the scheme will be corruptible internally and externally and provide a field day for booming high-tech fraud. As for immigration, would-be incomers do not have to have identity cards and on social security fraud well over 90 per cent is down to lies about circumstances, not identity. There remain some basic cultural doubts. Should the state manifest a presumption of trust towards its citizenry, or is that onus now to be reversed, and, if so, with what effects? Will a surveillance state strengthen or weaken the body politic and citizen allegiance long term? And will our unparalleled new security regime lead to diminishing returns, like an excess of antibiotics? The Lords, after 60 hours of debate, sensed that red lights are already flashing on all these issues and stood resolute against this pig in a poke.