US/UK: The Rancid Relationship

by Richard Norton-Taylor for the Guardian - March 23, 2006

A senior British military commander in the invasion of Iraq said the other day that Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, should be tried for war crimes. He was speaking in private and, I assume, did not mean to be taken literally. But there was no mistaking the anger in his voice. It reflected a deep fury at the decision to disband the Iraqi army after the invasion, a decision that was the formal responsibility of the US proconsul Paul Bremer, but, according to British officials, was actually taken by Rumsfeld - and is now regretted even by the neocon warriors in Washington. It also contradicted orders given by British military chiefs to their commanders in the field.

This resentment - shared by senior officials in all key Whitehall departments - is compounded by warnings from British officials to ministers well before the invasion that the Bush administration had no post-invasion strategy. That these warnings were made is clear from leaked Whitehall and Downing Street documents. They also show that, despite Rumsfeld's claims, the US did need British help. "The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical," a secret record of a Downing Street meeting noted on July 23 2002. Meanwhile, Tony Blair agreed that Britain would take the lead in eradicating the opium harvest in Afghanistan, the origin of 90% of British heroin. In his new book, State of War, James Risen quotes a CIA official as saying: "The British were screaming for us to bomb those targets because most of the heroin in Britain comes from Afghanistan. But they [the US military] refused." He writes: "The Pentagon feared that counter-narcotics operations would force the military to turn on the very warlords who were aiding the United States against the Taliban and that would lead to another round of violent attacks on American troops."

Risen refers to a meeting between Rumsfeld and Afghan commanders where the message was clear: help fight the Taliban and the US will leave the traffickers alone. British troops are now preparing for a "nation-building" mission to counter insurgents and narcotics in southern Afghanistan. It could take 20 years, according to a leaked Ministry of Defence briefing paper. What is Washington doing in return for all Blair's help? Bush has blocked a billion-dollar deal with Rolls-Royce to build engines for the proposed joint strike fighter - which Britain wants for its two new aircraft carriers - despite repeated lobbying from Blair. The US still refuses to share advanced military technology with us. It is refusing to let British agencies question terrorist suspects, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged September 11 mastermind; it won't even say where they are being held.

There are two areas that traditionally are said to prove the value of the "special relationship" - the Trident strategic nuclear-missile system, and intelligence. Yet there are question marks over their value. What is Trident's purpose or worth in a post-cold-war world? GCHQ, meanwhile, spends time and money eavesdropping on targets at America's behest. As an internal GCHQ manual put it: making the relationship sufficiently "worthwhile" to the US "may entail on occasion the applying of UK resources to the meeting of US requirements". Is it in Britain's national interest to be so closely allied to a US that takes Britain for granted, to an administration that sets up Guantánamo Bay - where the treatment of prisoners led a high-court judge to remark that "America's idea of what is torture is not the same as ours and does not appear to coincide with that of most civilised nations"?