Just Finished Reading: How Churchill Waged War – The Most Challenging Decisions of the Second World War by Allen Packwood (FP: 2018) [264pp] 

You really can’t discuss (or arguably understand) the Second World War without reference to Winston Churchill. Although he wasn’t British Prime Minister at its outbreak, indeed he was still very much in the political wilderness at that point, it wasn’t long before he assumed that position on the resignation of Neville Chamberlain. But what made him such an effective leader and how did he cope (and indeed keep his job) when things went badly wrong? 

This honestly fascinating analysis of Churchill’s strategic and political thinking during WW2 not only increased my appreciation of the man himself but really enhanced my understanding of the North Africa campaign in particular. Previously I had looked on the fighting there in a simple one-dimensional fashion – it was to protect the Suez Canal and the MUCH shorter route to India and the rest of the British Empire. This is indeed true – but barely tells half of the story. Of course, the loss of Egypt and the Canal would have been devastating and maybe could have knocked Britain out of the war (or at the very least lengthened the conflict significantly) but its simple retention would have merely enabled the existing status quo. The significance of the North African campaign was far larger than that. Firstly, it would show the Russians that Britain was still in the fight and was drawing away troops from the Russian Front. This, hopefully, would bolster Russian resistance and prevent them from making a separate peace with Germany. Continuing the fighting in the North African desert also showed the Americans that we were not beaten and that it was worth their time and expense to keep sending us weapons and other goods to continue a (potentially) winnable war – despite what Roosevelt’s ambassador to Britain was feeding him. The ongoing conflict in Africa also (probably) had an effect on both Spain and Turkey preventing them from joining the Axis Powers (although I don’t think that Spain seriously contemplated this so soon after their Civil War). Finally, despite the victory in the Battle of Britain (as well as the ongoing slog in the Battle of the Atlantic) the British Army had yet to develop the fighting skills to beat the Germans in particular (the Italian Army was CRUSHED in the early North Africa battles) at their own game. Once the right General was in place and the right weapons in his arsenal the Afrika Corps was sent packing, and the strategic initiative started to swing in favour of the Allies. The rest, as they say, is History. 

As the author is the Director of the Churchill Archives Centre it should come as no surprise that this is a deeply researched work. Covering the initial decision to assume the role as Prime Minister, to the type of Government he created on the assumption of that role (being both PM and the first Minister of Defence), to the competing demands of fighting in France and then coping with her defeat, his approach to both the USSR and the USA as allies or potential allies, to coping with (and politically surviving) the Fall of Singapore (something I MUST read far more about) to, finally, Churchill’s decision to fight the 1945 General Election on his war record – and LOSE! I learnt a LOT from this book, and it has become one of the best Churchill books I’ve read so far. Highly recommended to anyone who wants to understand British warfighting policy in WW2 and those who want a deeper insight into how Winston thought and fought.