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Thursday, April 12, 2018


Just Finished Reading: The War in the West – A New History: Volume 1 Germany Ascendant 1939-1941 by James Holland (FP: 2015)

We all know the story. In September 1939 the technically advanced German army along with the best air support in the world erupted across the Polish border and started World War Two. Quickly defeating the Polish armed forces the victorious Germans turned on Norway, the Low Countries and France completely dominating them in frightening quick succession with Britain only surviving destruction by the skin of its teeth. Barely holding on during the Battle of Britain the English breathed a sigh of relief when Hitler attacked Russia despite his forces sweeping all before them yet again. Meanwhile German U-boats sank unprecedented numbers of allied ships bringing Britain’s capitulation due to starvation ever closer. Only America’s massive manufacturing base untouched by war could keep pace with both the increasingly desperate demands of the British and the depredations of the wolf-packs prowling the Atlantic.

All of that, or at least a goodly chunk of the received narrative is nonsense according to the author of this impressive part-work. Running to a little over 720 pages I waited until I had a lengthy break to do it justice. At the beginning of the book I was largely of the opinion that a mixture of luck, fortitude and Winston Churchill saved the day back in 1940. My opinion has since shifted somewhat. Although German armed forces are normally portrayed as technically brilliant and highly advanced this is only part of the story. Only a small number of German units were fully mechanised – most forced to walk across Europe – and the Army itself used thousands of horses to transport everything from supplies to artillery. Despite being famous for its tanks it transpired that France both had more of them and of a higher quality. The British Expeditionary Force sent to France was actually a far more integrated and mechanised force than the Germans it faced prior to the ‘Miracle of Dunkirk’. In the air the Germans initially had the advantage of any attacking force – the ability to attack anywhere at their own choosing without their enemies knowing where to concentrate their defences. When they tried it over the Channel and the South East of England it was a very different story. With Radar and a co-ordinated aerial defence strategy the Luftwaffe quickly realised they were up against something they had yet to face – an enemy air force at least their equal technically and one much better directed, led, supplied and reinforced. Looked at in this way it is little surprise that the Battle of Britain was lost by Germany and was a defeat they never really recovered from. Not only did this leave a powerful and dangerous enemy on their western flank but it also showed the world that German might could indeed be challenged and overcome. Britain then became a future bridgehead into Continental Europe growing stronger each month and ever eager for payback. Rather than dealing with this problem Germany and Hitler stupidly looked East.

Looked at from the point of view of Germany’s need for resources – rather than as just a string of German victories – things start making sense a great deal. With the Southern flank apparent secure with Italy joining the Axis and with the non-aggression pact with Russia (inexplicable to many at the time) securing the Eastern flank Germany needed a quick series of victories before their resources bottomed out and before the inevitable British blockade began to bite. It was a hell of a gamble and everything had to go right – always. Norway was only a victory of sorts securing sources of iron but losing much of its naval forces in the process (effectively meaning that a successful invasion of Britain became much more problematical), the invasion of Holland and France although spectacularly successful resulted in the loss of many aircraft that would take time to replace – using up precious resources – and this was exacerbated considerably by the failure to destroy the RAF at even greater cost. Despite a series of quick wins England was still in the fight and actually getting stronger. In order to secure the required resources to continue the fight the occupied territories were asset stripped and the much avoided war on two fronts became a necessity. Again the great gamble was undertaken with the attack on Soviet Russia. Everything rested on a complete and swift victory. If that was impossible then everything was lost.


Whilst not exactly a revisionist history this rather hefty volume did look at the same events we all know and look at them from much more an economic and strategic point of view. When you realise how strapped for resources Germany was even in 1939 when they started the whole affair you can see why they reacted how they did and why they attacked where they did. But the author shows the reality of the situation. From the earliest days of the conflict Germany was in a bind. Everything it did had to go well. Yet even victories as unprecedented as the 6 week defeat of France only made matters worse not better. Occupation cost men, time and money. Every tank lost, even plane shot down, every bullet fired had to be replaced from a shrinking pool of resources and through a highly inefficient production system. As the war grew though necessity the problems just got bigger and bigger. Eventually they would get so big as to fall on the Axis powers and bury them. As soon as they failed to defeat Britain (an almost impossible task in 1939 the author maintains) it was only a matter of time before the German war machine lay in ruins. This was a very interesting look at a war I’m pretty familiar with or I thought I was familiar with. It has both made me rethink my views on the war and feel the desire to dig deeper into the many strategic decisions (almost always bad) made by the Germans in particular in the early years of the war. There is much food for thought here and much to chew over. I’m really looking forward to the second volume which I’ll be reading over Christmas. Highly recommended for all history buffs.

6 comments:

VV said...

Great review! I just downloaded it on my Kindle/iPad. The economic angle is one thing haven't read much about. I'm looking forward to it.

Mudpuddle said...

pretty interesting...

Brian Joseph said...

The book sounds fascinating. I did a lot of reading on this part of The Second World War when I was younger. I should read this book now. I am remembering Alistair Horne's to lose a Battle. If I recall, that book talked about how the British and French had advanced armor and tanks but they did not deploy them effectively.

CyberKitten said...

@ V V: It really brings to the forefront just how much resource issues drove Germany war strategy. Of course, war being war, things never quite worked out how they hoped and at every turn the resource issues just got worse!

@ Mudpuddle: It's my favourite part of the war - backs against the wall, everything to play for and finally finding our feet.

@ Brian: That's right. Both the French and British were both more mechanised than the Germans. More than once they missed the opportunity to really toss a wrench into the German war machine but hesitated too long by which time the Germans had attacked and the Allies were pulling back.

Stephen said...

This definitely sounds like a book worthy of reading and studying. One of my professors commented that the Germans plagued themselves with too much breadth in their arms and not enough depth as the war progressed -- that is, they had an incredible variety of useful weaponry, but the very variety of their arms defeated the ability to keep sufficient reserves of ammo and replacement equipment. Sounds like this book would touch on that?

CyberKitten said...

When the German's started preparing for war they made great efforts to reduce their need for a whole host of spare parts but never really managed it. 'Recovering' vehicles from France and the kit the British left on the beach both helped and hindered. Even the factories they took over in Czechoslovakia only added to their problems. What also didn't help was that many of their weapons, although generally very good, were over-engineered which meant that they were difficult to use, difficult to repair and difficult to replace. At the end of the war, post Normandy, many of the German tanks (for example) where not destroyed in combat but either ran out of fuel or simply broke down and had to be abandoned. It was a logistical nightmare.