Just Finished Reading: The War in the West – The Allies Fight Back 1941-1943 (FP: 2017)

Despite the loss of Continental Europe by 1941 the West had survived the onslaught of the Axis Powers. Without neutralising Britain, even if hardly ready to take the fight to the Germans yet, the next objective was an invasion of Russia. Delayed by the necessity to push the British out of Greece and Crete a late start to Operation Barbarossa was going to cause problems if things did not go exactly as predicted. At first they did. The German armies advanced deeply into Russia destroying whole armies and taking millions of prisoners. They looked, and must felt as if, nothing could stop them. But there was always another river to cross, another town to take another counter-attack however ineffective, to fight off. The Russian’s capacity to resist after enormous losses was staggering.

Meanwhile the British had not been idle. On the twin battlefields of North Africa and the Atlantic seaways they were making progress. Despite some early losses at sea the British Isle was actually stockpiling food and other resources as well as turning ever more acreage over to farmland. In contrast Germany was having to cut the national ration and had ordered food to be recovered from conquered territory no matter the cost to the local inhabitants. German lives would come first. Advances in the desert forced Hitler to send precious resources to bolster the Italians in their efforts to take Egypt from the British. Always a sideshow for Hitler it was a running sore which haemorrhaged men, vehicles and material that was needed elsewhere on the vast plains of Russia.

Before the cowardly attack in December 1941 the US was already supplying war resources that Germany could only dream about. Starting from a very low level US manufacturing of weapons and ships began to skyrocket thanks to the efforts of industrialists assigned to the task by President Roosevelt. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the gloves really came off and America went into hyper-drive now fighting a war across two great oceans. But more was needed. Ships and tanks were one thing but men were needed to make them work. Britain was reaching the peak number available for the conflict but needed more. Americans would fill the gaps and enlarge the size of the Allied armies enormously - given time.

Despite a slow start and despite both bad press and a steady opposition the idea of effective strategic bombing began to gain traction. At first using largely unsuitable aircraft with emerging technologies in too small a number the overall effect of night time bombing was negligible. But with more and, more importantly, larger four engine bombers coming on stream the concept of the 1,000 bomber raid slowly became reality and started to have an effect on the German economy especially. Because Germany had never envisaged a long war little innovation had been built into its weapons programmes. The Me109 that had fought so well in the Battle of Britain had already begun its long slide into obsolescence. As better and better models of Spitfires came off the production lines in the UK and new American fighters and bombers began to arrive in ever greater numbers the Luftwaffe increasing found itself on the back foot. Losing experienced pilots and machines it could not easily replace the quality and quantity available to challenge the new 24 hour air assault steadily declined.

Far too late Hitler realised that the Battle of the Atlantic needed to be won if Germany was to have any chance of beating the West. Unfortunately for the U-boat commanders by the time this lesson had been learnt it was already too late. Close co-operation between the British Navy alongside the Canadians and the US together with the increased use of long range bombers and ever improving technology – both defensive and offensive – made an attack on a convoy a very hazardous proposition indeed. As U-boat Ace after Ace sank to the bottom or were captured, inexperience crews faced ever more challenges from a resurgent and confident naval coalition. Plus no matter how much Allied tonnage sank on the way to Britain a Liberty ship rolled off the gangway faster than the U-boats could sink them.

As 1943 approached it was clear that the tide had turned in the Allies favour. They held North Africa after years of tough fighting, the Atlantic shipping lanes were almost clear of enemy submarines, an ever greater tonnage of bombs fell on both Germany and Italy and the Russians had held the line and were starting to push back. It was the beginning of the end for the Axis.

This is the middle book of the new trilogy history of the War in the West – largely looking at things from a resource/logistics point of view rather than just battles and war leaders. It’s a very interesting perspective and actually brings into sharp focus the reason why the various powers did what they did and when they did it – often because they had to! The author continues his debunking of the German superiority myth which is a difficult thing to do really. We seem to have grown up with the idea of German invincibility (or at least technical superiority) which often does not appear to have been the case. Looking behind the seemingly efficient surface propaganda we can see just how inefficient, chaotic and just plain delusional it all was. The author maintains, with much to back him up, that the Axis Powers simply couldn’t win against the Allies once they had woken up from their pre-war slumber. After their failure to knock Britain out in 1941 it was only a matter of time before the Germans and their often distressing allies were crushed. Whilst I didn’t think this had the same powerful impact as the first volume (helped no doubt by my fascinating with the 1939-41 period) this was still very much an excellent look at some of the pivotal moments in modern history. It’s a hefty and wrist aching 707 pages (not counting appendices, index and massive bibliography) but most definitely worth the effort to hold it!