Just Finished Reading: Chamberlain and the Lost Peace by John Charmley (FP: 1989) [212pp] 

The word ‘appeasement’ can hardly be used, it seems, without an accompanying frown, a head shake or the inevitable link between it and war. Appeasement is, without argument, wrong. Or at least so I had been led to believe all through my school years. The Second World War was at least in part due to Prime Minister Chamberlain’s failure to deter Hitler from the relentless expansion of a resurgent Germany inevitably leading to war and the death of millions. It’s quite a lot to lay at the feet of a British Prime Minister, but does the idea hold any water? 

My previous reading on the subject, in both non-fiction and novelised format, painted a much more sympathetic picture of Chamberlain and the obvious strain he was under up to and during the 1938 Munich talks. Rather than concentration on that narrow window, this densely argued book looks at the period May 1937 to September 1939 when it all fell apart. Chamberlain and (most of) his cabinet had one primary aim in mind – to avoid war. With memories of the previous cataclysmic conflict still very fresh and with an accurate reading of British public opinion the PM not only believed that he could negotiate with Hitlers Germany but that he had a moral imperative to do so. Unlike the French (for a whole host of good reasons) the British were not wedded to the workings of the Versailles Treaty and, again in line with public opinion at the time, saw the need to redress what had been done – both for the practical reason of reducing tension and in the name of fairness. Anyone could see that the Versailles Treaty was often overly harsh and more often both counter-productive to the aim of peace and in blatant contradiction to the principles of self-determination which lay at its foundation. So, when German moved troops into the Rhineland the British said little. Likewise, talk of ‘readjusting’ the Versailles imposed borders caused few in England to lose much sleep. Those few, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden among them, were seen as trouble-makers, alarmist and even warmongers. 

Several things, over and above a deep reluctance to becoming involved in yet another European conflict, drove the arguments for appeasement. For purely economic reasons, it was argued, a strong and prosperous Germany was going for the whole of Europe and, indeed, the world. With many countries only just emerging from the Great Depression (or struggling to do so) not only was war and rearmament to be avoided on cost grounds an economically resurgent Germany could be the locomotive to pull Europe out of the doldrums. Britain had no commitments in the East, where Germany promised any future expansion would take place, so any conflict of interests did not exist. Germany was also seen by many in the West as a bulwark against Communist Russia so at least some expansion East was seen as a good thing. France, however, was a problem. France had a mutual protection pact with the new state of Czechoslovakia and Britain had a pact with France. With growing tensions in the Czech Sudetenland, it was possible that France could be pulled into conflict with Germany and this could also pull Britain into a war it wanted no part of.  

For France to save face and to avoid a war that neither France nor Britain was prepared for an immense pressure was put on the Czechoslovak government to co-operate with the Germans and given them what they wanted. Reluctantly eventually they did. Hitler promised, in writing indeed, that he had no more territorial ambitions and the Sudetenland would be the end of things. History, as we know, told a very different story. The selling of Czechoslovakia in the name, or at least the hope, of peace left a bad taste in everyone’s mouths. The later full occupation of that country by German armed forces showed the world that German could not be trusted. At that point, Britain finally started to seriously rearm for what many started to see as the inevitable coming conflict. When war finally broke out in late 1939 Chamberlain, who had worked so hard to avoid it was a broken man. Appeasement had failed and he knew, all too well, that history would blame him for it – and it did. 

Despite reading about this previously late last year, I still learnt quite a bit about the run up to World War Two. As with the previous book I was actually surprised at how sympathetically Chamberlain was portrayed here. He honestly had very little ‘wriggle room’ in his options – constrained by economics, war readiness, public opinion and our French allies. If he had pushed for a harder line and the Czech invasion had become a trip wire to a European conflict it’s entirely possible – indeed probable - that the combined forces of France and Britain would have been defeated completely. Would a harder diplomatic line and military threat (or actually bluff!) have stopped Hitler’s ambitions? That’s rather doubtful. Chamberlain was stuck between a hot rock and a very hard place. He knew that he had sacrificed Czechoslovakia to buy time for both Britain and France to get into a position where they could fight Germany and win. It didn’t sit well with him and it didn’t sit well with the country. The Czech invasion showed clearly that Europe was on the path to war. This rather thin volume had a rather impressive amount of information and analysis packed into it. I certainly have a great appreciation of what Chamberlain (and others) were going through as they tried to negotiate their way through a diplomatic and potentially military minefield. I really couldn’t help but feel sorry for him. Definitely worth a read if you can get access to a copy. More on this subject to come..