Just Finished Reading: 1940 – The World in Flames by Richard Collier (FP: 1979) [323pp] 

Covering the first full year of the Second World War is quite the challenge and the author makes quite a good go at it. From the Phony War, the Norway Campaign, the Fall of France, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, the invasion fears, the Blitz and so much more we are presented with a world, with a way of life, being ripped apart. Apart from the actual battles we are also presented with the political aspects of the great conflict – from Vichy France, the arguments and upheavals in the UK parliament and often heated debates in the US between isolationists and those who wanted to get more involved (directly or indirectly) in the conflict. 

Unfortunately, despite covering the ground well, I’m going to spend the rest of this review criticising the book in ways large and small. I’ll start with the small to get it out of the way. Now, I’m not generally a stickler for footnotes. If something needs to be said, then say it in the main text. There are times when footnotes are useful, but I don’t generally demand them. Here, however, their lack irked me many times. The problem was when the author was quoting people – especially those who disagreed with each other – without sufficient (or any!) context. What would have been useful would to know exactly when and where the people involved said such things – in letters to others or in dairies written soon after the event? Or in minutes of meetings? Or in autobiographies written years (or decades) later complete with faulty memory? It’s IMPORTANT.  

Then we have the generally laudable idea of contrasting the world events and political decisions made in lofty smoke-filled rooms in the world’s capitals besides the experiences of the men and women on the ground. So far so good. Unfortunately, I found that the authors use of this ‘plot device’ kept slowing the narrative down resulting in a jerky overall feel to things. The micro-narratives where also generally too long and contained too many irrelevant details. I was tempted more than once to skim read those bits! 

My final (and most major) problem I had with the text was the general tone of things. I think anyone with even a cursory knowledge of the war understands that the Allies at the start of things were unprepared for the conflict to say the least! Of course, the Axis Powers were also unprepared for a LONG war, but that’s a whole other issue. The author, much to my annoyance, constantly harped on about the lack of modern Allied equipment, hidebound leaders, poor communications, and so on. Yet, the British still managed to save around 400,000 troops at Dunkirk, prevent any possible invasion of the UK and roundly beat the Luftwaffe over the South of England. Whilst it's true that the British took around 2 years (admittedly MUCH longer than it should have) to finally figure out exactly how to beat the Germans on land, both the Royal Navy and the RAF already had their measure very early on.  

The iconic Battle of Britain is a case in point. Both the Spitfire and Hurricane were comparable to the standard German fighters of the time and, gradually, in the next 4-5 years became much better than their German rivals. The reason the Luftwaffe failed to win air superiority over Southern England are numerous, but it is largely due to the fact that they had never encountered a modern integrated air defence system before – because such a thing had not existed before the British invented it during WW1 and perfected it in WW2. Such innovations cannot simply be dismissed with the usual ‘last minute’ and ‘thrown together’ platitudes as it was anything but. The truth of the matter is that the RAF actually INCREASED in size during the battle. Each day the RAF received or recovered more fighters than they lost. There was NEVER a shortage of airframes only the worry of a shortage of qualified pilots. The reason for the nighttime bombing raids during the Blitz was that it was FAR too dangerous for the Luftwaffe to attack in the daylight! 

Likewise talk of invasion. Op Sealion (of which more later!) was unlikely to go ahead and even more unlikely to succeed. Although it couldn’t really be dismissed out of hand and was certainly a concern at the time any careful analysis of the idea would’ve shown just how unlikely it was. The RAF was never really in danger of being swept from the skies in 1940 and without that the proposed invasion – with tugs pulling flat bottomed barges for God’s sake! - would have been a massacre. Likewise, without much of a navy of their own, the German forces attempting a crossing would have been cut to pieces by the Royal Navy. If you compare the proposed German invasion force in 1940 to the actual Allied invasion force in 1944 it's really obvious that the German operation would have failed spectacularly. The supposed incompetence and inadequacies of the British forces, even at this early stage of a STEEP learning curve, were all too often overplayed by the author which really didn’t help my enjoyment of the book. 

Anyway, I’ll get off my soapbox now and take a DEEP breath. Generally, this wasn’t a bad book (or at least not a terrible one). It’s readily apparent that the author was a journalist rather than a historian which explains a great deal. The ground he covered – factually at least – was competently done and has prompted me to investigate some areas further (which is good). But it was the tone of the writing more than anything else which soured me to this work. Reasonable.