Just Finished Reading: The Berlin Airlift – The Relief Operation that Defined the Cold War by Barry Turner (FP: 2017) [265pp]

It was a decision made for good military reasons. The war was, in effect despite fighting still going on over bar the surrender ceremony. There was just no point racing the Soviet’s to Berlin. It would only result in more Allied dead – and for what? Agreements had already been hammered out and been confirmed (or so the Allies thought and believed) about the disposition of Germany after the armistice. Areas on influence had already been mapped out, so why rush?

When Germany finally surrendered in 1945 some American units found themselves in what was to become the Soviet Zone and pulled back to their side of the line. The Allies quickly found out that the Soviet’s where somewhat less speedy at giving up territory they had fought and died for. When British troops finally arrived in their Berlin Sectors – after roads had to be cleared of mines and bridges assured safe to cross – the Russians were already in de facto control of what remained of the city and had already removed a great deal of valuable equipment. Only with some reluctance – blamed on poor communication/bad translation and the requirement for any such move to be authorised from Moscow – did the Russians walk away from areas they had so recently pacified. The Allies quickly realised that this background obstructionism was only the start. Over the next few years the Russians made every move and every change – to say nothing of every slight improvement of conditions in Berlin – as difficult as possible. Stalin was hoping, expecting indeed, that the Allies would quickly tire of their holdings in Berlin (and then the rest of Germany) and either fall out amongst themselves or just wash their hands and leave. Frustrated at their apparent refusal to accept ‘reality on the ground’ Stalin pushed events by blockading all road, rail and canal entry into Berlin. With millions of German’s dependent on Allied deliveries of everything from food and coal to salt and steel the Soviet’s expected starvation conditions within weeks and revolt or retreat shortly after. What else could the Allies do – FLY the supplies in? The Russians (and the Germans) knew just how difficult this was and both had realised in the war that air supply just wasn’t a practical option. Stalin sat back and watched as he expected Berlin, Germany and then the rest of Europe to fall into his lap. He was going to be very, very surprised. As the first tiny shipments arrived after flying through 120 miles of Soviet airspace it looked, even to the Allied pilots, like an impossible task. But President Truman and others were determined to give it their best shot. Over the next 11 months almost 300,000 flights delivered over 2 million tons of much needed food and other supplies to that beleaguered city. It was probably, and probably still remains, the greatest logistical effort in world history.

I’d read about and been impressed by the Berlin Airlift before but I was equally impressed by this detailed (if rather short) look at the event that defined the beginning of the Cold War. Incredibly the author used the first 100 pages or so going over the background to the events – not only highlighting conditions in Europe post-1945 but also the political calculations in Washington, London and Paris as they weighed up the implications of action or inaction at this critical juncture in post-war relations with the Soviet Union. The second half of the book looked at the airlift itself and the many logistical hurdles that the Allies had to surmount without much of the technology we take for granted with air traffic control. It was truly an amazing achievement.  Told with a casual expertise and with many human stories woven into the narrative this was a fascinating read for anyone interested in the Cold War, German post-war history or even logistics itself. Definitely recommended.