Just Finished Reading: 1941 – The Year Germany Lost the War by Andrew Nagorski (FP: 2019) [305pp] 

I have long argued that Germany made three significant mistakes in 1941 which essentially lost them the war, so it was good to find an author (another journalist rather than a historian) that agreed with me. But although we were definitely on the same page the author of this excellent history was rather more nuanced than I was.  

The first, arguably less vital mistake, was not finishing off the British on their left flank after losing the Battle of Britain and indefinitely ‘postponing’ the invasion known as Operation Sealion. Hitler was, apparently, sure that Britain posed a low threat as she was under constant air attack and the vital Atlantic convoys were under constant pressure. Hitler assumed that she would eventually have to ask for an armistice before widespread starvation set in. He wasn’t completely off base but failed to take into account Churchill’s ‘bulldog’ spirit and Roosevelt's growing assistance in Britain's war effort. 

Oddly, Germany’s (or actually Hitler’s) second mistake was at least in part supposed to address his first. The planned invasion of the Soviet Union was supposed to take out a future potential ally of Britain (thereby making Britain's situation hopeless) and also discourage further American involvement in the European war. After the lightening victories in the West even the sceptical German army commanders started to believe that they could defeat Russia in a matter of 2-3 months. This was despite, or maybe because of, the lack of any adequate intelligence of Soviet capabilities or even decent maps of the region. The initial attack – aided immensely by the fact that Stalin had refused to believe that such an attack was coming despite mountains of evidence to support it – was a huge (indeed unexpected) success and seemed to validate Hitler’s belief that a simple door kick would be enough. Here’s were the authors nuance comes in... In the earliest days, as German forces advanced into Poland and the Ukraine, at least some of the locals saw the Wehrmacht as liberators rather than invaders (which is rather difficult to wrap your head around knowing what was coming). But this opportunity was very quickly thrown away as the advancing German forces were told to neither stop nor take prisoners. It wasn’t long before the ‘liberated’ became partisans – another fatal mistake. 

Belief trumped reality when, after months of conflict, frontline commanders sent back requests for winter clothing. As the Russians, who had been dying or surrendering in their millions at this point, were expected to collapse at any minute now such frivolous (indeed almost treasonous) requests were denied. Indeed, despite being within sight of the outskirts of Moscow itself, Wehrmacht commanders were ordered to swing south to finish off Ukraine before returning to take the Soviet capital and communication hub as the first snowflakes began to fall. Interestingly, as civilians and government officials began to leave Moscow, Stalin was just about to board his armoured train for the ride East when he suddenly changed his mind and returned to the Kremlin. From that moment anyone seen leaving or looting was shot on sight. By the time the Germans returned the cities defences had been enhanced and fresh units from the Far East had begun to arrive. 

Hitler was eager for his Far East Axis partner Japan to attack Russia in 1941, but Japan had other ideas. Not only was it committed to operations in China, but it was just about to launch its fateful attack in the Pacific. Spies inside the German embassy in Tokyo knew that no attack against Russia was forthcoming and Stalin, eventually, believed them and repositioned hardened winter trained troops west to defend Moscow. Three days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Hitler made probably his biggest mistake of the war. With little advantage to himself he declared war on the USA in support of the Japanese attacks. His military commanders were appalled but Hitler believed that the Japanese would draw the majority of American forces against them – and hold them – and that the American economy couldn’t transform from peace to a war footing in time to prevent an Axis victory. He was, as we now know, wrong. 

This was a MUCH better read than my previous book on this fateful year. Part of that I think was the author's primary focus on Europe (especially Germany & Russia) although there was much too on American moves and attitudes to the war itself and the situation in China. Another thing which helped the narrative move along was the fact that the author didn’t need to repeatedly ‘change gears’ from a high to low level focus on the personalities involved. Here we (mostly) stayed at the policy/command level rather than literally in the trenches – though there was some of that sprinkled throughout. This was a very well written detailed account of a pivotal year in WW2 and goes a long way to explain exactly why Germany lost it. I’m looking forward to reading more by this author who certainly seems to know his stuff. Highly recommended.  

Just one more 1940’s focused history to come next before leaping to the 1960’s...